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The aim of the paper is to explore regionalism and the 
representation of sub-regional identities in a regional in-
stitutional-setting. This is especially important for Croatia 
as it struggles and repeatedly fails to introduce a territo-
rial restructuring of the meso-level of its local government 
(counties) and to increase the size of its counties by trans-
forming them into regions, in parallel with a stronger push 
towards decentralisation. The academic community and 
the general public have been advocating the transforma-
tion of 20 counties into a smaller number (mostly five) of 
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larger and stronger regions, but opposition has come from 
interest groups connected with current county system, 
including local political elites. This paper focuses on the 
ways to overcome some of the stronger disagreements over 
the potential “bundling”, or amalgamation, of areas with 
differing and idiosyncratic cultural, political, historic, and 
socio-economic heritages into a greater region. Therefore, 
a comparative analysis of sub-regional representations in 
selected European countries is used to show a way to re-
solve the impasse.
Keywords: regionalism, regionalisation, sub-regional rep-
resentation, regional parliaments, counties, Croatia, local 
government
1. Introduction1
Current academic, political, and public discussions about the regional-
isation of Croatia are connected with the need to redefine its current 
county structure. Croatia introduced counties in 1993 as part of an in-
stitutional transformation of the previous communal system (komunalni 
sistem) into a modern system of local self-government, organised on the 
basis of administrative and political decentralisation and the principle of 
subsidiarity. Instead of following contemporary trends in regional gov-
ernment organisation in European countries, Croatia found its inspira-
tion in the nineteenth-century county organisation of Croatian territories. 
This resulted in the introduction of twenty rather small counties as the 
middle (regional) tier of self-government. In addition, Zagreb as the cap-
ital city was granted the special status of town and county at the same 
time, raising the number of counties to twenty-one in total. Prior to the 
constitutional reforms of 2000, the counties had the dual role of central 
government units and self-governing units. The county mayor was elected 
by the county assembly but at the same time had to be approved by the 
1 The first version of the paper was presented at the international scientific confer-
ence Decentralisation policies: Reshuffling the scene, Dubrovnik, 7–10 May 2015, organised by 
the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and the Institute for Public Admin-
istration Zagreb (IJU). The authors would like to thank the participants for their valuable 
input, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
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president of Croatia. However, their role as central government units was 
predominant in comparison with the role of self-government units. Dur-
ing the 1990s, counties constituted one of the main instruments of the 
centralisation of Croatia.
Following constitutional changes in 2000, and the adoption of new local 
self-government legislation, the role of the counties changed significantly. 
They became solely self-governing units and their role as central govern-
ment units was – although still present – organisationally and functionally 
separate from their role as local government units. Despite the reforms 
that were promoting decentralisation, the territorial structure of counties 
remained intact. This probably remains the critical issue regarding the 
position and the role of counties in Croatia. Counties, although they are 
units of regional self-government, are not perceived as significant actors 
in the public governance system. They lack the capacity to provide a wider 
array of public tasks and their financial situation is not promising either.2 
For example, only four counties have a positive fiscal position (Bajo et al, 
2015); Croatia has only four big urban centres with more than 100,000 
inhabitants that should serve as centres of development of their wider sur-
roundings (Šimunović, 2007; Ivanišević, 1999; Đulabić, 2015); and there 
is general consensus among scholars and the general public in Croatia 
that the county structure should be modified.3
Based on the situation described above, there is obviously a need to re-
form the Croatian county structure in order to transform it into a real 
regional tier of government with a smaller number of larger units that 
would be able to provide services to citizens and to serve as anchors of 
wider regional identities that exist in Croatia. There are several priorities 
of the much needed reform, such as: a) territorial restructuring that would 
decrease the number of counties from twenty plus Zagreb to four plus the 
Zagreb metropolitan area, b) strengthening their fiscal position and wid-
ening the counties’ self-governing scope of affairs, c) strengthening their 
coordinating role concerning the local units within their territory with re-
gard to providing public services to citizens, and d) orientation of counties 
on issues of economic and social cohesion, especially the utilisation of EU 
funds (Đulabić, 2011; 2017).
2 For the position of counties following decentralisation in 2001 see e.g. Koprić, 2001.
3 Stručnjaci složni: Ovako više ne ide, Hrvatska mora smanjiti broj županija, gradova i 
općina http://republika.eu/novost/37192/strucnjaci-slozni-ovako-vise-ne-ide-hrvatska-mora 
-smanjiti-broj-zupanija-gradova-i-opcina, Županije – pozivanje na povijest radi blokiranja 
budućnosti http://wp.me/p2R6LY-cy 
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Despite these well-known facts, pushbacks are constantly encountered – 
both at the national as well as the local/sub-regional level – regarding the 
need to reorganise the county structure. Regionalisation was mostly a ta-
boo subject for the first 20 years of Croatian independence, and has only 
gained stronger public recognition – albeit weary and sceptical –in recent 
years. It is therefore necessary to ask why the concept of the “region” is 
charged with such symbolic meanings that it fundamentally defines the 
identity not only of a collective, but of an individual as well. One answer, 
provided by Agnew (2013, p. 7), states that a “region typically conjures up 
the idea of a homogenous block of space that has a persisting distinctive-
ness due to its physical and cultural characteristics. This basic assumption 
on the nature of a region, serves as a hurdle to the process of innovative 
thinking.”
There have been several disputes about the uses of regions as well. First, 
how are regions integrated and how homogenous are they or should they 
be? Second, if regions are “real”, in the sense of marking off distinctive 
bits of territory, then the notion that they are a product of social conven-
tions and political circumstances does not hold. With that in mind, a third 
dispute is linked to the idea that a region is not mutable, but is fixed for 
a long period of time. Fourth, regions are fundamental contexts of social 
life as opposed to mere accounting devices. The fifth dispute is connected 
to the tendency to represent the character of regions by placing them 
along a temporal continuum ranging from backward or traditional ones to 
advanced or modern ones. Sixth, regions are often seen as diametrically 
opposed in character to the realities of population movements that form 
an evident part of many people’s lives – i.e., regions are simple spatial con-
tainers that cannot possibly match the dynamism of mobility. Seventh, 
regions at subnational level are entities destined to fade in significance 
(Agnew, 2013, pp. 12-14). All of these disputes reflect more than mere 
technical questions of how to best organise a population within a specific 
territory. Rather, it has more to do with the identity attached to oneself, 
and how that identity corresponds with the region one lives in (or origi-
nates from).
With that in mind, the main research question of the paper is how large 
political regions should be and how various sub-regional identities should 
be represented in the institutional structure of these regions, mainly in 
representative bodies as the main democratic institutions of representa-
tive democracy. Do larger regions allow for the preservation of particular 
sub-regional identities or are these identities fully absorbed by a wider re-
gional identity? How have sub-regional identities been represented in the 
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institutional structure of wider regions? Both the main question as well as 
the auxiliary questions presented here are important for several reasons. 
First, the constant increase of public affairs performance costs requires a 
stronger organisational base of self-governing units. This is the case with 
several current territorial reforms in some European countries, which are 
trying to reduce the number of regional units because of cost-saving pol-
icies.4 Secondly, every regional identity consists of several sub-regional 
(local) identities, which are expressed with different intensity. These iden-
tities grow strong if the territorial organisation of a particular country sup-
ports their expression. In this case, any subsequent attempt to rationalise 
the territorial structure of the country is practically deemed unsuccessful. 
Croatia is facing this type of situation, with counties practically petrified 
as units of regional self-government although there is a growing number 
of voices in favour of their rationalisation and reduction in number (Ko-
prić, 2015; Blažević, 2010; Đulabić, 2011). One way forward in such a 
situation is to examine the possibility of ensuring the representation of 
county identity within the institutional structure of future larger units. 
The paper is divided into five parts. This introduction is followed by an 
analysis of the interconnectedness of the political ideology of regionalism 
and regionalisation as an effort to introduce regions into the institutional 
architecture of a particular country. Part three deals with sub-regional 
representation and identity formation as a particularly important issue of 
regionalisation, and the creation of bigger political regions comprised of 
several local communities, which often have stronger sub-regional politi-
cal and social identity. Part four deals with the need in Croatian society, 
advocated by various actors (e.g. the academic community, the media, the 
general public, and some smaller political parties), to reform the current 
county structure, which is perceived as too fragmented and not suitable 
for the performance of tasks connected with the regional government tier. 
The concluding part combines the previously elaborated arguments and 
4 France is the most prominent example of such reforms, with a decrease in the 
number of regions from 21 to 12 in metropolitan France (plus Corsica). The reform was 
introduced by Regional Boundaries Act of 16 January 2015. Only five regions retained their 
former boundaries, while all the others have been merged. In 2005 Denmark decided to 
reduce the number of counties and replace them with five regions. The reform was fully op-
erational as of 1 January 2007, reducing number of counties (amter) from 14 to five and the 
number of basic local units from 275 to 98. Discussions about reducing the number of lower 
units are underway in Germany and Italy, without significant changes as yet. For details on 
regionalisation trends in Europe see Merloni, 2016.
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sketches the main points that could lead to the potential reorganisation of 
the Croatian county structure.
2.  Regionalism and Regionalisation – Two Sides  
of the Same Coin
Regionalism is a distinct political ideology that tries to make regions the 
centre of political and social construction of a particular society. Today it 
is considered a legitimate political idea despite the fact that regionalism 
is not, and never has been, a homogenous social and political movement. 
Keating (1998, p. 10, 11) distinguishes between six types of regionalism 
that may be observed from the nineteenth century onwards. Regionalism 
first developed as a conservative movement which opposed the moderni-
sation of society and the establishment of nation states. It was inspired by 
the idea of preserving the existing privileges of particular interest groups, 
in connection with territorial control. This was followed by ‘bourgeois 
regionalism’, primarily connected with industrial and economically pros-
perous regions and their need to establish an institutional structure that 
would support further progress and advancement of economically vibrant 
urban regions. Modernising regionalism as the third type is described as 
“technocratic and depoliticised and less linked to class interest.” It was 
“motivated by a largely depoliticised vision of development and moderni-
sation.” (Keating, 1998, p. 10). The fourth variant of regionalism is associ-
ated with the political left and could be labelled “progressive regionalism.” 
It emphasises further democratisation of society, equality, and solidarity 
of the various parts of a country. On the opposite side of the political 
spectrum, “populist and right-wing regionalism” may be found – a version 
of regionalism that opposes the central state, fiscal equalisation, and fi-
nancial support of the disadvantaged regions of a country. There are sepa-
ratist movements in many European states which represent the sixth form 
of regionalism. It is directed against existing states and has a clear goal 
of establishing separate and independent states. This form of regionalism 
has gained significant momentum with referendums in Scotland and Cat-
alonia (although not formally recognised by the Spanish government) in 
2014 and the autumn of 2017 respectively.5 Regionalism is an adaptable 
5 A region is not a space delineated by borders from other spaces; a region is an in-
terplay of social, political, and economic activities focused on making citizens’ lives better. 
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and flexible set of ideas about the organisation and governing of states 
that could easily find its place within every major political ideology.6 As 
has been stated, regionalism “... has been linked at one time or another 
to almost all the ideologies, from the extreme left to the extreme right, 
passing through liberalism, social democracy, and Christian democracy.” 
(Keating, 1998, p. 10).7
There is no unified and widely accepted definition of a region8 that could 
serve as the basis for a unified conception of regionalism, which would 
in addition be common to all (or at least most) European countries. It is 
If regions are not keen on cooperating with neighbouring regions due to the difference in 
the level of economic welfare, then their focus on guarding their own historical and ter-
ritorial idiosyncrasies is nothing more than hidden economic chauvinism. A characteristic 
example is the region of Lombardy in northern Italy, which was, under Lega norde and Lega 
Lombarda, constructed as a space of regionalism with a reactionary political defence of its 
affluence against the poor Italian south (Jones & McLeod, 2004, p. 436). Regarding the 
Croatian example, with the electoral campaign of 2015 came calls for the amalgamation 
of 20 counties, current meso-level territorial units, into 5 or 6 regions. The strongest voices 
against this rose from the most affluent parts of Croatia (excluding the capital of Zagreb, 
of course) – Istria and Međimurje. It is thus necessary to consider whether the opposition 
to the idea of regionalisation is based on the historical idiosyncrasies of these two regions, 
or if it is focused on protecting their political power and their economic wealth (more so in 
the case of Istria than Međimurje) from their poorer neighbours. Because, as Agnew (2013, 
p. 8) states, “the drawing of regional differences above and below the national scale also 
frequently involves deploying such familiar, and often theoretically unexamined, conceptual 
oppositions as modern-backward, … and core periphery.”
6 The modern language of regionalisation sees regions as products of networked flows 
and relations fixed in a more or less provisional manner (Allen & Cochrane, 2007, p. 1162). 
Hence they are malleable to change, and not fixed entities. The modern notion of a region 
sees attaining benefits as a much more important element of a region’s formation than ter-
ritorial organisation. The functional element trumps the identity-based one. According to 
Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 1163), “the governance of regions, and their spatiality, now 
works through looser, more negotiable, set of political arrangements that take their shape 
from the networks of relations that stretch across and beyond given regional boundaries”.
7 The truthfulness of this statement may be clearly seen in Croatian politics, where 
several parties from the different poles of the political spectrum embrace and support the 
idea of regionalism and advocate strengthening the role of regions. One is the Istrian Demo-
cratic Assembly (Istarski demokratski sabor – IDS), a mainly left-wing party with a significant 
liberal agenda, while the other is the Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja 
(Hrvatski demokratski sabor Slavonije i Baranje – HDSSB), a nationalist party that advocates 
strengthening the position of Slavonia and Baranja, which are currently divided into five 
counties. While IDS strongly opposes any amalgamation of counties that would result in 
Istria becoming part of a larger region, HDSSB would support the amalgamation of five 
current “Slavonian counties” into one larger region. 
8 Despite the lack of a functional definition, three congruent interpretative dimen-
sions make a region identifiable – strategic, cultural, and functional. A region will have its 
own identity if it is different from others in terms of its politically-induced strategic plans, 
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rightly stated that “it is impossible to define a basic concept of the region” 
despite the fact that “regionalisation is a widespread trend in the territo-
rial organisation of European States” (Marcou, 2000, p. 22). This is the 
main reason some authors hesitate to define the region as a concept, but 
instead define different types of regionalisation (Marcou, 2000, p. 24). 
Marcou distinguishes between five types of regionalisation: a) administra-
tive regionalisation; b) regionalisation through the existing local author-
ities; c) regional decentralisation; d) political regionalisation, or regional 
autonomy (institutional regionalism); and e) regionalisation through fed-
erate authorities. However, there are several types of regions that could 
be addressed depending on the dominant criteria of classification (see 
also Marcou, 2014). Bearing this in mind, it is possible to discuss political, 
administrative, historical, statistical, development, and economic regions 
(Đulabić, 2007), which are results of the different types of regionalisation 
as categorised by Marcou. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, 
a region is defined as a middle-level territorial unit comprising the area 
between local and central level of government, in which several local com-
munities are connected by a distinct regional identity and which possesses 
a special institutional structure with some degree of political autonomy. 
Two types of regionalism are especially interesting in this case. The first 
is found in regions with distinct cultures and strong identities, while the 
second arises from functional needs in regions in terms of strategic plan-
ning, coordination of activities, and large-scale public service delivery, 
and especially those regions which are facing a decline of their traditional 
industries and need to develop strategies of economic regeneration and 
promotion of their potential at home and abroad (Parks & Elcock, 2000, 
p. 87). A Croatian example of the former would be either Dalmatia or 
Slavonia – currently carved into four and five different mid-level territorial 
units (counties) respectively. The latter definition of regionalism is the one 
used to explain the need to establish mid-level territorial units even in cas-
es when smaller units have cultural idiosyncrasies and a historically built 
narrative of a separate identity. In that sense, the sub-regional identities 
of Istria or Međimurje, could be, on mere functional elements, incorpo-
rated into larger mid-level territorial self-governing units called regions (or 
counties, or provinces, or something else). Functionally-based regionalism 
is particularly successful at keeping the central government accountable in 
terms of delivering economic modernisation and development.
believed or produced cultural assets, and its functional/morphological dimensions (van Hou-
tum & Lagendijk, 2001, p. 751).
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Regionalisation has taken different forms in Europe and has been ignit-
ed by various reasons that support regionalisation processes in different 
European countries. On the one hand, there are administrative reasons, 
which have aimed to introduce regionalisation in order to effectively man-
age central government affairs across a whole territory. This was particu-
larly the case in large and populous countries and was aimed at achiev-
ing a vertical integration of public governance. This was an initial stage 
of regionalisation in many countries and resulted in the establishment 
of administrative regions without self-governing capacity.9 On the other 
hand, there are strong political reasons supporting the idea of regionalisa-
tion, and these are usually connected with strong regionalism movements. 
These political reasons were aimed at allowing the existence of separate 
regional identities, albeit allowing the regions in question to remain part 
of a larger nation state. Finally, there are economic reasons which have 
been perceived as an important factor of regionalisation. This was espe-
cially the case in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and has been very much 
connected with the evolution and strengthening of regional policy (cohe-
sion policy in EU terms) as a separate field of public policy.
These reasons are in many cases intertwined; regions that were first in-
troduced as administrative regions would in later stages be gradually 
transformed into political regions. Today such regions operate within the 
multi-level governance system of modern European society, which was – 
under the significant influence of the process of Europeanisation in the 
late eighties and early nineties – labelled as the “Europe of the regions.” 
This concept was intended to describe the organisation of Europe as rely-
ing heavily on the regional level of government. However, it was not able 
to gain stronger roots and have a notable unifying effect due to different 
constitutional positions of the regional tier in various European countries 
and the disharmonised position of regions in different countries. 
Regionalisation in Western European countries took place in a few waves. 
The first happened in the late 1960s and the 1970s, while the second caught 
Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was also to a large extent stim-
ulated by the process of EU accession and by recognising the regional level 
9 The main elements that constitute the self-governing capacity of any given territory 
are local elections, the legal personality of a territorial unit, a wide scope of local affairs, 
autonomy in governing local finances, the ability to regulate the local scope of affairs, nar-
rowed supervision (control of legality and constitutionality of functioning and absence of 
strict hierarchical control) of the central state, the capacity to self-organise its administrative 
apparatus, the possibility to freely cooperate with other territorial units (domestically and 
across national borders), etc. (Koprić et al., 2014, pp. 252–253).
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of government as one of the important factors of EU regional policy legit-
imisation. This was summarised in the “Europe of the regions” and in the 
establishment of the Committee of Regions as important elements of the 
EU’s overall institutional setting.10 
In contrast to this, regionalisation in Central and South Eastern Europe 
took a slightly different development path. Political regionalisation did 
not occur in the early 1990s as a general trend towards democratisation 
and the revival of local government values. This was mostly because the 
regional tier was in most former communist societies associated with the 
“obnoxious” earlier communist regime. The current disorganisation at the 
subnational level of territorial organisation is hard to disentangle and re-
form, as there is no rulebook to follow on how to construct the territorial 
division of a newly democratised state. Some of the most striking insti-
tutional variations, according to Scherpereel (2007, p. 26) occurred at 
the intermediate, or meso tier (between the local and national level) of 
self-government.
Regional issues in most countries (with Croatia as an example of a differ-
ent development path) joined the agenda only by the end of the 1990s, 
largely as part of the EU accession process and the need to adapt the 
institutional structure of a country to manage EU structural funds effec-
tively.
Simultaneously, regionalisation is a process which has evolved from a gen-
eral trend of democratisation and decentralisation of administrative sys-
tems in the member states. Today, it is almost impossible to find a country 
without some form of sub-national level of government. The regionalisa-
tion of a country has a considerable impact on its system of regional policy 
management. However, it is also true that the requirements of regional 
policy management influence the processes of regionalisation.
European countries today may be grouped into several main categories 
with regard to the position and constitutional status of regional govern-
ment units. There are federal states, where regions have the strongest role. 
In these countries regions have the formal status of federal units, which is 
at this point in history the strongest position that may be granted to a sub-
10 As Kettunen and Kungla (2005, p. 369) state, regional councils formed in Finland 
helped, for example, to implement EU structural funds. Hence, new regional assemblies 
might increase the absorption capacities of local and regional administrative units, especially 
with regard to structural and cohesion funds, and in cross-border cooperation programmes 
by focusing the grant-writing process as well as financially guaranteeing the obligatory parts 
of own funds. More is better than less in this case.
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national unit (e.g. Germany, Austria). The second group of countries are 
formally regionalised states, with regional governments in a strong position 
but not as strong as that of federal units in federal countries (e.g. Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom). The next category consists of unitary 
decentralised states where regional units have the position of self-govern-
ing units (e.g. Poland and France). Finally, there are unitary centralised 
states with the regional tier of government in quite a weak position. Their 
position in the public governance system is seen as more administrative 
than political and self-governing (most of the post-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe). These categories are not static; instead they 
are dynamic and countries may gradually transition from one category to 
another (e.g. Belgium being the most prominent example of such institu-
tional development).
There are several important preconditions for the effective and efficient 
functioning of regional institutions. “Democratic potentials of the regional 
self-government depend on many factors, such as the design of represent-
ative and other political institutions, on the channels of direct democratic 
influence of citizens, on the self-government scope of affairs, on the dis-
cretion of regional authorities, on regional human, financial, organisational 
and other capacities, on the overall territorial organisation of a country, etc. 
In spite of a similar historical and socio-political context, there are certain 
differences with regard to these factors, decisive to the democratic role of 
regional governments in the region.” (Koprić & Đulabić, 2012, p. 2).
3.  Formation of Regional Representative 
Bodies and Their Influence on Sub-Regional 
Representation
The processes of democratisation, integration, and Europeanisation that 
have engulfed European states over the last sixty years have had a sig-
nificant influence on the level of federalisation, regionalisation, and de-
centralisation in almost all of them. Several preconditions were necessary 
for such transformations to occur. The democratisation of European so-
cieties put pressure on political elites to allow ever greater opportunities 
for the citizens to govern themselves; hence the idea of strengthening 
local and regional levels of government as those closest to the citizens and 
therefore more capable of responding to their needs. The integration of 
the continent into a single, although loosely connected, political system, 
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required the transfer, or “pooling” (Dinan, 2010), of sovereignties to the 
supranational level. This political process gave birth to the counter pro-
cess of requiring a similar transfer from the national level to subnational 
representative bodies, not only in unitary states with complex national 
frameworks (i.e. the United Kingdom or Spain), but in regionalised states 
as well (i.e. Italy). The European Union, besides the integrative element, 
also influenced stronger regionalisation attempts via the process of Euro-
peanisation. Institutional reforms, like the introduction of the Committee 
of Regions; policy reforms, like the introduction of funds for inter-region-
al (cross-border) cooperation and the cohesion policy; and reforms of the 
political process, like the introduction of subsidiarity principle strongly 
influenced regional political elites, demanding more power from national 
capitals. 
With that in mind, besides the general move to form nation states or to 
fight for autonomy in self-government in cases where independence is not 
yet possible (Catalonia) or desired (Scotland), the contemporary move 
towards regionalisation must be viewed in a European context.
Electing own representatives at all levels is one of the preconditions of 
a functioning representative democracy. Representative bodies therefore 
have a strong influence on how to understand, define, and interpret what 
a region is and how the inhabitants of a region see themselves. A council, 
assembly, or parliament is a practical manifestation of both the political 
powers of citizens and their identity (Ravlić, 2017).
However, identity preservation and political representation are not the 
only roles representative bodies play. In a contemporary, globalised world, 
the focus has increasingly been placed on the functional adaptability of 
a political system. Hence one needs to perceive a region not merely as a 
subnational territorial entity with a specific, culturally or historically built 
identity, but as a vessel for functional amalgamation focused on the eco-
nomic and social development of a specific set of citizens.11
How then can the idea of regionalisation be strengthened by moving 
away from the territorial and symbolic, and towards functional interaction 
based on similarities and focused on gaining benefits for the population? 
As Fawcett (2004, p. 432) states, the territorial definition of a region is 
unlikely to take us very far, and we therefore need to refine regions to 
11 As Agnew (2013, p. 12) states, functional ties include network/circulation linkages 
(i.e., transport, migration) and central-place links (settlement hierarchy) that create distinc-
tive regions and from which their other characteristics are derived.
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incorporate commonality, interaction, and the possibility of cooperation, 
whose members display identifiable patterns of behaviour.
Despite all boundaries being mere constructs of historical opportunities, 
reasonable ideas of a functional amalgamation of sub-regions may fall 
through due to already established local identities, especially in cases of 
a top-down approach to boundary formation (Parks & Elcock, 2000, p. 
97). Although it could bring about positive outcomes to sub-regions like 
Istria, Dubrovnik, or Međimurje, the entrenched interests of local elites 
disguised as the idea of preserving local political and cultural identity, de-
marcated by a fixed (albeit unseen and unfelt) border, might spell doom 
for functional unification. Hence representative bodies must empower all 
stakeholders in the policy-making process and guarantee the notions of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, which would allow regional representa-
tive bodies a proactive role in all developmental matters in their region.
Subnational authority is a broad vessel which may subsume many dif-
ferent actors and institutions. These can be politicians, bureaucrats, em-
ployees of national government bodies and local self-governments, citizen 
representatives, etc. (Scherpereel, 2007, p. 26). When building a new in-
stitutional framework, the focus should not only be on what already exists, 
but also on what can be constructed and would help to fulfil the role the 
region was given.
Therefore, the examples that follow incorporate both “mainstream” ideas 
of institutional formation, as well as some original ways of using existing 
institutional variations – such as bicameralism, vested interest representa-
tion, and electoral systems – and recombining these in order to form a 
foundation which would be acceptable for a new regionalisation policy. 
With that in mind, cases of sub-regional representation in the United 
Kingdom (Scotland, England, and Wales), and Poland (the Polish voivod-
stva) will be analysed briefly. These examples will form a backbone to 
explaining the possible modalities of a regional institutional framework in 
the case of Croatia.
3.1.  The Case of the Scottish Parliament 
After the introduction of the Scotland Act, the UK government in Lon-
don accepted the right of the Scottish people to elect their own represent-
atives. Therefore, a regional representative body with legislative powers 
was established. The first elections to the Scottish Parliament took place 
in 1999, according to a specially adopted electoral law. There were sev-
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eral specific elements attached to the law that represented the peculiar 
Scottish position and which did not necessarily align with the position of 
the Westminster government. The first among these was the type of the 
electoral system that would be used to elect the Scottish parliament. Most 
people wanted to avoid using the first-past-the-post system (the relative 
majority system) used in the UK general elections, and wanted instead to 
introduce a system which would closely reflect the views of the Scottish 
people and produce a fairer match between the way the people voted and 
the number of MSPs elected from each party.12
Therefore, the additional member system was used, being midway be-
tween plural voting and proportional voting. All voters have two votes. 
The first vote is used to elect the representative of one’s constituency by a 
simple plurality (the winner takes all), and for this the whole of Scotland 
was divided into 73 single-member constituencies. The second vote was 
cast for a party and not for an individual candidate, along the premise 
of proportional voting. This time the whole of Scotland was divided into 
eight regions with seven candidates in each region. 
This way the representation of voters was more proportional, while the 
effectiveness of the governing party or coalition was maintained. At the 
same time, specific regional idiosyncrasies can be maintained and pro-
tected by boosting the representation of (sub-)region-specific political 
parties. In this case, no part of regional society (e.g. local communities) 
feels that they will be a permanent minority.
3.2.  The Case of the National Assembly of Wales
Like in Scotland, the citizens of Wales were given the right to elect their 
own regional representation. It is, although to a lesser degree than in the 
case of the Scottish Parliament, autonomous from the government in 
London. This distinction stems partly from historical reasons; namely, the 
earlier submission of Wales to the rule of the crown than was the case 
with Scotland, as well as the difference in the ways co-optation occurred.
The members of the Welsh National Assembly are elected according to 
the same rules operating in Scotland – the additional member system. The 
first vote is cast for a local constituency member. A member is elected for 
each of the 40 constituencies in Wales by the first-past-the-post system, 
12 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/visitandlearn/Education/16285.aspx 
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the system whereby MPs are elected to the House of Commons – i.e., the 
candidate with the greatest number of votes wins the seat.
The second vote is cast to elect a regional member. The voters vote for a 
political party. Each party must supply a list of candidates for the addi-
tional member seats in rank order. Wales has five electoral regions, and 
four members are elected to serve each region. The electoral regions are 
based on the European Parliamentary Constituencies created in 1994. 
Each electoral region covers between seven and nine constituencies.13 The 
electoral regions are hence constructed administratively, but they encom-
pass specific, historically idiosyncratic areas.
3.3. The Case of English Regions
The example of English regions is completely different from the previous 
examples of Scotland and Wales. While the Scottish and Welsh cases show 
the ways in which regionalisation and the subsequently formed represent-
ative bodies follow the identity matrix formed on the cultural and historical 
idiosyncrasies of those regions, the case of England shows the importance 
of a function-based approach to regional formation. Hence the represent-
ative bodies have different roles as well as sources of legitimacy.
As England is carved into several mainly non-identity based regions, their 
legitimacy is derived from functional, not territorial, sources. Their repre-
sentative bodies also have different priorities, and are therefore formed 
according to different basic assumptions. The role of a representative 
body in this type of situation is not to preserve the identity of an area or 
to safeguard its peculiarities, but to help implement structural, technical, 
and policy reforms aimed at the economic development of a region. These 
new political arrangements then depend on a fragmented collection of 
institutions and agencies whose members come together in a series of 
networked relationships, fostered through involvement in formal and in-
formal forums (Allen & Cochrane, 2007, p. 1165). This means that the 
coordination of activities is at least as important, if not more so, than the 
formalisation of the institutional structure.
For example, the South West Regional Chamber (or Assembly) compris-
es representatives of local authorities, as well as economic and social part-


















and spatial planning in the region (Jones & MacLeod, 2004, p. 441). Sim-
ilarly, Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 1164) point out that, with regard to 
England, regionalised structures that have emerged serve to strengthen the 
position of the region precisely because of the way that regional actors have 
reimagined themselves as players within the changing environment. This is 
a practical example of regional cooperation based not on territoriality, but 
focused on functional interest instead. What this means in our case is that 
sub-regions could have the capacity to be in the driving seat of the region-
alisation effort, in order to shape the new region as they see fit. As Bond 
and McCrone (2004) argue, with regard to the case of English regions, 
many have no great significance in terms of identity. This means that there 
need not be any link between the top-down process of forming regions and 
building new regional identity. Hence critics of the new regionalisation 
process – at national, local, and sub-regional levels – can rest assured that 
newly formed regions will not destroy existing (national and sub-regional/
local) identities. They are mere functional vessels for optimal cooperation 
leading to the greater development of a territory and its citizens.
3.4.  The Case of Regional Assemblies in Poland
Poland as a unitary, newly democratic, or transitioning state is in some 
aspects similar to Croatia. Historically, its regions have suffered turbu-
lent, peculiar histories unlike any others, but were incorporated into a 
single state after the Second World War. Hence an analysis of its regional 
representation is in order, and may offer some guidance in constructing 
a potential case for Croatian decentralisation and regional (legislative) 
representation.
Poland is administratively divided into municipalities (gminy), counties 
(powiatow) and voivodships (wojewodztwo), all of which are directly elect-
ed. Several counties are amalgamated into one of 16 voivodships, whose 
citizens are represented in a sejmik, or regional assembly. Members of a 
sejmik are elected by proportional representation in multi-nominal electoral 
districts, which are composed of a single county or a subsection of a larger 
county. Electoral districts are established according to the “natural” bound-
aries of counties, if the entire county constitutes one electoral district, or by 
special decision of the sejmik if the county is split due to a large population. 
Then in each electoral district between five and 15 candidates are elected.
The most important article of the electoral law is article 164, which states 
that no county, if kept intact, can elect three fifths or more members of 
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the electoral parliament.14 By means of this provision the legislator has 
tried to prevent any possibility of larger counties overpowering smaller 
counties in the regional parliament, maintaining the powers of the citi-
zens of smaller counties to influence the legislation and other activities 
in sejmiks.
4.  Territorial Reorganisation of Croatia and 
Sub-Regional Representation
The idea of amalgamating many fragmented local (or in our case sub-re-
gional) self-governing systems is not new, nor is it specific to Croatia. 
Failures of such reform ideas are usually the same regardless of the coun-
try or system. As Kettunen and Kungla (2005, p. 363) describe, the at-
tempt to transform Finland’s 250 units of local government into 15+5 
failed because central government politicians were afraid that they would 
lose support in the localities concerned. As was shown earlier, the same 
fear is blocking the reform of the Croatian self-governing system at the 
local and (sub-)regional level.
Still, the reform of the administrative territorial division was subject to 
the interests of political elites, who almost completely monopolised the 
narrative of the subnational administrative division. In that regard Croa-
tia was similar to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, where regions 
became top-heavy, subservient, and penetrated by party interests, as well 
as guarded by local party organs that kept a close watch on local adminis-
trative bodies (Scherpereel, 2007, p. 25).
The inclusion of various currently autonomous, or merely existent, sub-re-
gional entities into a larger mid- (or meso-) level territorial-functional en-
tity may be focused on showcasing and strengthening the best and most 
competitive elements of each in an interconnected manner focused on 
further regional development. But that “interconnectivity provides a varia-
tion on the theme of meso-level capacity, under which local, regional (and 
even national) authorities need to develop efficient horizontal and vertical 
relationships – or at least to avoid damaging zero-sum disputes” (Cole, 


















of a new, regional representative body, the ways to avoid a zero-sum game 
in which one region wins at the expense of (an)other region(s).15
In recent years there have been several attempts to depart from the exist-
ing county structure and to introduce different – at least administrative, if 
not political – regionalisation but these attempts have faced rather severe 
opposition from several political actors and have not been implemented. 
Following several proposals from the academic community (e.g. Koprić, 
2015; Blažević, 2010; Đulabić, 2011, etc.), who advocated a reduction in 
the number of counties and their transformation into larger regions, the 
media, the general public, and several smaller political parties accepted 
the idea that the reform of the county structure is needed. 
Although some administrative fields have already departed from following 
the existing county structure as a basis for the organisation of their fields 
(e.g. the organisation of the judiciary and the court system in Croatia 
does not follow the current county structure), several attempts to follow 
suit in other administrative areas have failed. Three examples support 
this statement. In 2014 the Croatian Parliament (Hrvatski sabor) adopt-
ed the new Regional Development Act (RDA). During the debate that 
preceded its formal adoption by the Croatian Parliament, the draft RDA 
introduced the concept of five “planning area“ (planska područja). These 
areas were based on existing counties and were mainly introduced for the 
purpose of more efficient regional policy management. Despite the fact 
that planning areas were envisaged as purely administrative entities and 
would not have any impact on county structure, this part of the draft RDA 
was strongly opposed during public debate. The final result of the debate 
was that the adopted version of the RDA does not contain any provisions 
regarding the planning areas. 
More or less in parallel with the draft RDA, which had been proposed by 
the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Public Adminis-
tration proposed amendments to the State Administration Act (SAA), 
with the idea of reducing the number of its deconcentrated offices from 
20 – one located in every county – to five in order to reduce operating 
costs and to increase the efficiency of these offices. Similar to the situa-
tion with the draft RDA, the draft SAA was criticised for the same reasons 
15 That does not, however, entail the often false assumption that in any territorial or 
functional amalgamation of an authority, poorer sub-regions gain by draining the richer. 
Every region, no matter how small or large, poor or rich, remote or centrally located, has 
enough comparative advantages to offer as long as the functionally-built region is based on 
logical notions of amalgamation.
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as the draft RDA. The result was that the Ministry of Public Administra-
tion withdrew the draft SAA from parliamentary procedure and did not 
pursue the adoption of other amendments either.
The main opposition to these drafts came from the Croatian Association of 
Counties (Hrvatska zajednica županija), an interest group representing the 
counties and controlled by county mayors who are mostly Croatian Dem-
ocratic Union (HDZ) members. In addition, these two draft laws came 
under severe criticism from the IDS, a regionalist political party that is in 
power in Istria County and was also in power at the national level as part of 
the ruling coalition during the deliberation of these two acts. Its main argu-
ment was that the introduction of planning areas and the reduction of state 
offices in counties would gradually lead to the abolishment of the existing 
county structure and an amalgamation of counties into bigger regions, as 
a consequence of which Istria would probably lose its status of a separate 
county. On top of this, several counties adopted declarations of particu-
lar features of these counties.16 These declarations as political documents 
served as an additional political pressure tool on the central government to 
withdraw the draft laws and abandon the proposed changes. All this pres-
sure was successful and resulted in the proposed changes being abandoned 
despite the support for the reforms that was coming from the academic 
community, the business community, and the mainstream media.
Finally, in the context of the presidential elections held in December 2014 
in Croatia, former Croatian president Ivo Josipović advocated constitutional 
changes as one of the important elements of his political programme for an-
other term in office. One of the changes he proposed – among other chang-
es to the Constitution – was the political regionalisation of Croatia and the 
introduction of several larger regions (he advocated the introduction of five 
to eight regions17). All these attempts have failed, mainly due to political pres-
sure from actors who would like to preserve the current county structure.
Considering the current political situation, as well as the state of academ-
ic and public debate regarding the regionalisation of Croatia, the main 
question is: what is to be done in order to move the process forward? It 
seems that one of the solutions is to propose the regionalisation of Cro-
16 As far as the authors are aware, five such declarations have been adopted by county 
assemblies and partnership councils. Declarations were adopted for the counties of Istria, 
Lika-Senj, Virovitica-Podravina, and the Partnership Council of the Dubrovnik-Neretva 
County. In addition, the small municipality of Saborsko adopted its own declaration. 
17 See https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sedam-josipovicevih-izmjena-ustava- 
procitajte-konacni-prijedlog-s-pantovcaka/700087/
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atia and the introduction of five political regions18 and at the same time 
ensure institutional guarantees according to which the sub-regions (i.e. 
the existing counties) will have adequate representation of their identity 
and political interests. 
The Croatian population lacks trust in political institutions at all levels 
(Sekulić & Šporer, 2010). How then, can the introduction of a new insti-
tutional framework be legitimised in such an environment? New regional 
entities require new institutions to handle new levels of administrative and 
policy complexity. If their reach is focused and strictly enumerated in a 
way that allows for a more coherent spatial logic of regulation (Albrechts, 
Healy & Kunzmann, 2003, p. 113), then the new institutional framework 
can acquire legitimacy and acceptance.
With that in mind, a multifaceted approach to regional representative 
bodies shows different levels of development, the historical idiosyncrasies 
of a (sub-)region, and contemporary socio-political divergences. Hence it 
would be reasonable to believe that different sub-regions of Croatia might 
be administratively and politically amalgamated into one meso-region 
(e.g. Slavonia, or Central Croatia), or into several regions (in the case 
of Dalmatia, for example, into Northern Dalmatia and Southern Dalma-
tia), and some could even remain separate, non-attached regions as they 
are now (e.g. Istria or Međimurje). Therefore, different representative 
bodies with different levels of autonomy and transferred powers could 
be established. To take an example from the United Kingdom, Jones and 
MacLeod (2004, p. 433) posit that the process of devolution brought the 
geography of “new regionalism” to the UK, which was represented by 
different kinds of regional representative bodies, varying in power, size, 
scope, nature of member election (direct or indirect), etc. Therefore, one 
can observe the Parliament of Scotland, the National Assembly of Wales, 
the Assemblies of Northern Ireland and London, as well as Regional De-
velopmental Agencies, and Regional Chambers in English regions.
However, because the process of regionalisation is a top-down process in 
Croatia (i.e. it is led by national elites), it may be argued that uniformity 
and homogeneity would be preferred to allowing divergence in the prac-
tical manifestations of representative institutional frameworks. The top-
down process of regionalisation is mostly inspired by the ideas of the plan-
18 An elaboration of the introduction of five regions may be found elsewhere in the 
literature, so there is no need to discuss it in greater detail here. See works of Koprić, 2015; 
Đulabić, 2011; Blažević, 2010, etc.
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ning era in the second half of the 20th century, when many governments 
developed policy capacities at the regional and local levels. In England 
or Finland, for example, regional planning authorities were established, 
designed to play a key role in setting up regional development plans and 
to provide better coordination of state policies at the regional level. These 
ideas have gained further momentum with a renewed focus on democrati-
sation and participation (Kettunen & Kungla, 2005, p. 354).
Taking into account previous examples, an institutional framework can be 
constructed in such a way as to preserve the sub-regional identities of spe-
cific sub-regions (some of them currently established as counties), helping 
to pave the way for their amalgamation into larger regions. Among the most 
important elements of such an electoral framework are two votes, used in 
the additional member system, splitting the votes to be cast for an individ-
ual representative in a single-member electoral district, and for a party list 
in multi-member electoral districts, and establishing an upper threshold, 
according to which no single sub-region could elect more than a certain 
number (three fifths, two thirds, or any other previously agreed upon num-
ber) of members into the regional assembly (Hennl & Kaiser, 2008).
Future regional representative bodies in Croatia could be formed as bi-
cameral legislatures, with the representatives of one chamber elected by 
an adapted additional member system of combined (plural and propor-
tional) elections. As may be seen in the cases of Scotland and Wales, the 
additional member system allows all citizens to have two votes. With the 
first vote all of them have an equal say (equal weight of the vote) in the 
election of, e.g., two thirds of a regional parliament through single-mem-
ber electoral districts. Having plural elections and electing specific candi-
dates would allow the citizens to hold their representatives accountable 
for fulfilling the promises they made during the elections (or failing to 
do so). That right is especially important for local and regional levels of 
government, because they deal with policy issues which affect citizens the 
most and which are closest to an average member of the public.
The rest of the assembly members are then elected by the second votes. 
Citizens cast their second votes for party lists in multi-member electoral 
districts. These multi-member districts can be designed in such a way as 
to follow the “natural” boundaries of a specific sub-region, allowing for 
the voters of each region to “pool” their votes by using their second vote 
for sub-region-specific policies. The number of representatives elected in 
an electoral district may either vary due to the difference in the popula-
tion size of each sub-region represented by an electoral district, or it may 
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be the same despite the difference in size. These representatives can be 
elected into the second chamber of a bicameral body.
Second chambers could also consist of representatives of distinctive 
sub-regions, but also of representatives of local civil society organisations, 
interest groups, and any other actor important for the region as a whole or 
a part of it. In our case it could serve as an example of extending the idea of 
new regions and its benefits to all the stakeholders. In the first chamber of 
a potential bicameral regional assembly one could represent the interests 
of the citizens of the region, while in the second chamber one could allow 
for the representation of sub-regional interests, with different historical or 
socio-political regions maintaining a level of influence and sharing it with 
the sectoral and functional interests19 of dominant stakeholders from the 
regions – be it farmer groups in Slavonia, tourist boards in Istria and Dal-
matia, or exporter groups in central and northern Croatia.
Each decision has its advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvan-
tage of the former is the inequality it creates between the citizens, because 
the votes of citizens from smaller sub-regions would be worth more than 
the equivalent votes of citizens from larger sub-regions. The advantage of 
such a proposal would be to prevent the citizens of larger sub-regions from 
outvoting those from smaller sub-regions every single time. That is also a 
disadvantage of the latter decision, because with a variable number of rep-
resentatives elected in each electoral districts smaller sub-regions (even if 
they are homogenous enough) would not be able to have their idiosyncra-
sies represented in a regional parliament in a manner that would safeguard 
said idiosyncrasies. The advantage of that proposal is, of course, the main-
tenance of equality among citizens (one citizen – one vote).
Even if we accept the necessity of maintaining equality among citizens by 
safeguarding the equal weight of each vote – which does not have to be a 
given, as cases of election of second chambers in many countries provide 
examples of functional representative bodies even when equality in voting 
is abandoned – this does not necessarily mean that smaller sub-regions 
19 Reform of regional self-government can, and often does, herald impulses of the 
future development of a region. It is therefore of continual interest for the central govern-
ment. The central government does not, or at least should not, focus solely on controlling 
sub-regional entities, but should establish a more constructivist view of helping enhance the 
internal qualities of local areas as well as regions as a whole, including their visions of the 
future (Crone, 2006, p. 39). In that regard, it is worth contemplating the idea of including 
some representatives of the central government in regional representative bodies, at least in 
a non-voting, advisory capacity. Thereby one gains an opportunity to present the central gov-
ernment as an interested party; i.e.; a stakeholder in seeing a region transform and develop.
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would be overpowered by larger ones. The example of elections for the 
representative bodies of Polish regions gives us a clue how to avoid this. 
By stipulating an upper threshold of mandates a certain sub-region can 
claim in a regional parliament, one avoids the trap of larger sub-regions 
marginalising smaller ones, while at the same time reducing as much as 
possible the inequality of votes among the citizens of a specific region. The 
upper threshold is arbitrary and depends on an a priori agreement between 
sub-regions, or on a decision of a national legislative body. It can be, and in 
a similar situation usually is, linked to specific majorities needed to enact 
special, important legislation. Therefore, they can vary from less than 50 
per cent of all mandates taken by a single sub-region in a regional parlia-
ment to three fifths (as is the case in the Polish example), two thirds, or 
even three fourths, although that would probably be too high a threshold 
that would allow for the complete dominance of the largest sub-region.
5. Conclusion
If nations are “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006) and states are 
practical manifestations of the political desires of respective nations, then 
territorial delineation is nothing more than a project led (or forced) by a 
certain collective. States are nothing more than visual representations of 
a group of people calling themselves a nation, maintaining a power over 
a part of physical territory. They are social constructs. Similarly, Agnew 
(2013, p. 8) insists that regions are mere inventions of an observer whose 
definition of what their region is says more about the political and social 
position of the observer than the phenomena the regions purport to classi-
fy. Or, stating it differently, a region is a social construct and not a natural 
or historic (in a Manifest Destiny sort of way) phenomenon. Hence it can 
be changed and reformed in an active manner – when the citizens of a ter-
ritory might benefit from the reform – and not only passively, when wars, 
revolutions, or natural powers exert their force of change.
Hence the transformation of existing counties in Croatia into stronger 
political regions should be placed in the wider context of regionalism and 
the regionalisation of European countries over the last fifty years. Regions 
have become a legitimate tier of organisation of European countries, with 
the tendency of strengthening and gaining additional powers in national 
political and administrative systems. Even countries such as France, a 
paradigm of the unitary state (Cole, 2006, p. 33), deem the idea of region-
alisation worthwhile in order for a more prosperous society to emerge. It 
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seems that the debate regarding the position of counties in Croatia and 
the introduction of regions should enter a new phase. 
This paper offers a proposal on how to take the process of the regionali-
sation of Croatia a step further and at the same time ensure that current 
county identities are preserved and not absorbed by the wider regions that 
would replace existing counties. 
However, at the same time it needs to be shown that new regional units 
in Croatia have the potential to become the focal points of developmental 
planning, taking into account the meso-level of territorial differentiation. 
Compared to similar processes in other countries, new regions have the 
potential to “become major regional planning bodies whose mission [it is] 
to give a substance to the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’, where regional 
identity [is] an important category” (Paasi, 2013, p. 1211).
According to Cole (2006, p. 51), decentralisation (and regionalisation) 
must be read as a process, not a single event, in which political arrange-
ment must be understood within the context of local, sub-regional, and 
sometimes regional political traditions, social dynamics, and econom-
ic change. What this means is that a new institutional structure can be 
formed, reformed, changed, and adapted to new realities, particularly if 
the structure is not optimal.
A new region does not ask that new loyalties be formed, or new centres 
of power be built, but enables the construction of a partnership area for 
cooperation between local, (sub-)regional, and national governments. As 
Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 1172) state, “it is ‘lodging’ of a wide range 
of political actors drawn from the national as much as the local domain 
that gives a regional presence to the new governance arrangements. The 
political assemblage is ‘regional’ because that is what its capabilities speak 
to, not because its authority is defined by territorial parameters.” As has 
been noted earlier, when taking regionalisation into account, one needs to 
have functionality and not (only) territoriality in mind.
As Jones and MacLeod (2004, p. 435) state, we need to differentiate 
between regional spaces and spaces of regionalism when we speak about re-
gionalisation processes. While regional spaces define ways of cooperation 
focused on economic development, based on similarities between adja-
cent sub-regions, local units, and smaller territorial communities, spaces 
of regionalism define processes in which subnational territorial units as-
sert claims to citizenship, or insurgent forms of political and cultural mo-
bilisation and expression with a focus on the formation of new contours 
of territorial government. In the case of Croatian regionalism, the discus-
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sion, especially among the critics of the policy, is focused on the latter 
definition. Critics of the new regionalisation of Croatia see the process of 
regionalisation as a space for the irredentist feelings of peripheral territo-
ries to run unchecked by the centralising tendencies of the nation-state, 
which can bring about the dissolution of the state as a final consequence. 
This paper has tried to show that by employing innovative institutional 
changes and focusing sub-regional differences in a regional representative 
body, on can move towards the regional spaces definition of regionalisa-
tion, where sub-regions such as Istria or Rijeka might see commonalities 
with one another and with neighbouring sub-regions, which would then 
make logical the idea of the amalgamation of sub-regions into a larger and 
more successful meso-region.
The search for bounded territories, within which electoral accountability 
may be constructed or state authority mobilised, has actively understated 
the emergence of different types of politics and forms of governance. In 
practice, it has proved impossible to construct institutional arrangements 
that can be captured by existing regional boundaries (Allen & Cochrane 
2007, p. 1166). What this means is that the topic of conversation should 
not be where the boundaries of a (sub-)region lie, but how to construct 
an optimal level of cooperation between different neighbouring areas fo-
cused on new models of policy activities.
As Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 1171) conclude, “it would seem that 
there is little to be gained by talking about regional governance as a ter-
ritorial arrangement when a number of political elements assembled are 
not particularly regional in any traditional sense, even if they draw on 
what might be called the “spatial grammar” of regionalism.“ Or, to put it 
simply, although one should stop linking regionalisation with territorial 
delineation and focus more on the developmental potentials of regionali-
sation, it is clear that in Croatia this is not currently possible. Hence this 
paper shows the ways how it could be made possible.
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REGIONALISM AND SUB-REGIONAL REPRESENTATION: A 
GUIDE TO THE COUNTY TRANSFORMATION OF CROATIA
Summary
The aim of the paper is to explore regionalism and the representation of sub-re-
gional identities in a regional institutional-setting. The main research question 
is how large political regions should be and how various sub-regional identities 
should be represented in the institutional structure of these regions, mainly in rep-
resentative bodies as the main democratic institutions of representative democra-
cy. Do larger regions allow the preservation of particular sub-regional identities 
or are these identities completely absorbed by a wider regional identity? How 
have sub-regional identities been represented in the institutional structure of wid-
er regions? This is especially important for Croatia as it struggles and repeatedly 
fails to introduce a territorial restructuring of the meso-level of its local govern-
ment (counties) and to increase the size of its counties by transforming them into 
regions, in parallel with a stronger push towards decentralisation. The academic 
community and the general public have been advocating the transformation of 
20 counties into a smaller number (mostly five) of larger and stronger regions, 
but opposition has come from interest groups connected with the current county 
system, including local political elites. The paper focuses on ways to overcome 
some of the stronger disagreements over the potential “bundling”, or amalgama-
tion, of areas with differing and idiosyncratic cultural, political, historic, and 
socio-economic heritages into a greater region. Therefore, a comparative analysis 
of sub-regional representations in selected European countries is used to show 
a way to resolve the impasse. The analysis covers parliaments and sub-regional 
representation in Scotland, Wales, England, and Poland. The paper is divided 
into five parts. The introduction is followed by an analysis of the interconnect-
edness of the political ideology of regionalism and regionalisation as an effort to 
introduce regions into the institutional architecture of a particular country. Part 
three deals with sub-regional representation and identity formation as a par-
ticularly important issue of regionalisation, and creating bigger political regions 
comprised of several local communities, which often have a stronger sub-regional 
political and social identity. Part four deals with the need in Croatian socie-
567






























ty, advocated by various actors (e.g. the academic community, the media, the 
general public, and some smaller political parties), to reform the current county 
structure, which is perceived as too fragmented and not suitable for the perfor-
mance of tasks connected with the regional government tier. The concluding part 
combines the previously elaborated arguments and sketches the main points that 
could lead to the potential reorganisation of the Croatian county structure. The 
paper shows that by employing innovative institutional changes and focusing 
sub-regional differences in a regional representative body, there can be a move 
towards the regional spaces definition of regionalisation, where sub-regions, such 
as Istria or Rijeka might see commonalities with one another and with neigh-
bouring sub-regions. This would then make logical the idea of the amalgamation 
of sub-regions into a larger and more successful meso-region.
Keywords: regionalism, regionalisation, sub-regional representation, regional 
parliaments, counties, Croatia, local government
REGIONALIZAM I ZASTUPANJE PODREGIJA: VODIČ ZA 
PREUSTROJ ŽUPANIJA U HRVATSKOJ 
Sažetak
U radu se istražuje pojam regionalizma i zastupanje podregionalnih identite-
ta u regional institutional-setting. Glavno je istraživačko pitanje usmjereno na 
otkrivanje idealne veličine političkih regija te kako bi unutar institucionalnog 
ustroja pojedinih regija valjalo zastupati različite podregionalne identitete. To 
se uglavnom odnosi na zastupnička tijela kao glavne demokratske institucije 
zastupničke demokracije. Je li moguće očuvati zaseban podregionalni identitet 
unutar veće regije ili će se on u potpunosti uklopiti u širi regionalni identitet? Na 
koji su način podregionalni identiteti dosad bili zastupljeni u institucionalnom 
ustroju širih regija? Za Hrvatsku su ova pitanja od posebne važnosti s obzirom 
na opetovane i neuspjele pokušaje provođenja teritorijalnoga preustroja mezo 
razine lokalne samouprave (županija), te pokušaja okrupnjivanja županija nji-
hovim preustrojem u regije i popraćenih većim stupnjem decentralizacije. Znan-
stvena zajednica i šira javnost zalažu se za preustroj 20 županija u manji broj 
(uglavnom pet) većih i snažnijih regija, no tome se protive interesne skupine 
povezane s postojećim županijskim ustrojem, uključujući lokalnu političku eli-
tu. U radu se nastoji objasniti kako odgovoriti na neka snažnija protivljenja 
potencijalnom spajanju, tj. amalgamaciji područja različitih i idiosinkrastičkih 
kulturnih, političkih, povijesnih i društveno-ekonomskih baština u jednu veću 
568














regiju. Usporedno se analizira zastupanje podregija u odabranim europskim 
zemljama kako bi se predložilo moguće rješenje, a analiziraju se parlamenti i 
zastupanje podregija u Škotskoj, Walesu, Engleskoj i Poljskoj. Rad se sastoji 
od pet cjelina. Uvod slijedi analiza međusobne povezanosti regionalizma kao 
političke ideologije i regionalizacije kao pokušaja uvođenja regija u institucion-
alni ustroj države. Treći se dio bavi zastupanjem podregija i stvaranjem identite-
ta kao važnim aspektom regionalizacije, te stvaranjem krupnijih političkih regi-
ja koje sadrže veći broj lokalnih zajednica s često izraženijim podregionalnim 
političkim i društvenim identitetom. U četvrtome se dijelu opisuje nastojanje hr-
vatskoga društva uz potporu brojnih društvenih aktera (npr. znanstvene zajed-
nice, medija, šire javnosti i pojedinih manjih političkih stranaka) da se provede 
preustroj sadašnjeg sustava županija jer ga se drži previše fragmentiranim i ne-
prikladnim za obavljanje zadataka na razini regionalne samouprave. Završni 
dio povezuje argumente razrađene u prethodnim dijelovima te opisuje glavne 
korake koji bi mogli dovesti do preustroja županija u Hrvatskoj. Opisuje se kako 
inovativne promjene u institucijama i usmjeravanje razlika među podregijama u 
regionalno zastupničko tijelo mogu dovesti do pomaka prema definiciji region-
alizacije kao regionalnih prostora. Prema toj definiciji podregije poput Istre ili 
Rijeke spoznati će međusobne sličnosti kao i sličnosti sa susjednim regijama. 
Time bi ideja amalgamacije podregija u veću i uspješniju mezo regiju postala 
logičnom.
Ključne riječi: regionalizam, regionalizacija, zastupanje podregija, regionalni 
parlamenti, županije, Hrvatska, lokalna samouprava
